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Religious Brotherhoods of Chechnya

collapse of state authority, (2) a lack of faith in state officials, (3) economic adversity,
and (4) persistent intervention by Islamic groups from abroad. The violence that came in
1999 to Dagestan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikstan was driven by these factors and
the Chechen situation is subject to the same factors.

Connections with Taliban and Other Outside Groups
Recognition of the fact that such an important and dynamic brotherhood can, like
other Islamic movements for national liberation, pose a challenge to Western society
prompts legitimate questions about their relationship with Islamic organizations outside
the region. While Islam did much to provide spiritual comfort to Chechen soldiers during
the 1994-96 war, it has undergone dramatic changes during the decade since the collapse
of the USSR. Most important, open borders have made it possible for Arab missionaries
espousing a more radical form of Islam to find convelts in the Caucasus region as well as
what was Soviet central Asia. The newly converted Muslims have been increasingly
hostile to Chechnya's traditional Sufi orders and have opened the door to outside groups
with more violent tendencies.
One such organization that has attracted attention because of these developments
is the Taliban movement. While there are important philosophical differences between
Chechen religious brotherhoods and the Taliban there are also some similarities. The
essential fact, however, is that within Chechnya there is little interest in the Taliban or,
for that matter, other such groups located abroad. The primary reason for this disinterest
is the fundamental provincialism of most Chechen movements. They see events and
actors within Chechnya and the Chechen community as of primary importance and all
others of limited relevance to their struggles.
Apparently, the Russians take the Taliban much more seriously. Reportedly,
Russian President Vladimir Putin feels Osama bin Laden and the Taliban have supported
Chechen efforts to gain their independence from the Russian Republic and has even
threatened to bomb Afghanistan if necessary.

Chapter Seven
ISLAM IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS: A PEOPLE DIVIDED
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Preface

Islam in the North Caucasus:
A People Divided
Yavus Akhrnadov, Stephen R. Bowers, and Marion T. Doss, Jr.
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While ethnic animosities have a long history in the North Caucasus, the religious
flavor of those conflicts appeared more recently. With time, Islam became a uniting force
that helped many people of the North Caucasus assert their struggle against the
oppression of those whom they viewed as "men without faith." However, while Islam
served as a rallying point for disparate groups within the region, Islam itself did not
assume a unified organizational model. Local customs and paganism had a profound
impact on Islam as it developed throughout the North Caucasus. Almost no expression of
faith could be characterized as "pure Islam."
When the religious element emerged as a significant one in this part of the former
Soviet Union, it varied greatly whether one encountered it in Daghestan, Inghusetia,
Chechnya, North Ossetia, Kabardin-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, or Adygeiya.
With the appearance of perestroika, religious diversity has a dramatic impact on the
traditional Islamic community. It may be that the only common element in the Islamic
community was the religious fervor that gripped so many people. New mosques appeared
by the score and Daghestan combined with Chechnya produced more pilgrims for the
annual hadj than the rest of the USSR combined.
Islamic diversity was driven by a variety of factors. One of those was the influx of
foreign money from Middle Eastern Islamic states. The persistence of local traditions was
another but the most important was the increased prominence of the Vakhabite movement
within the Islamic community. The central theme of this movement was that Islam in the
North Caucasus had been distorted by misunderstandings as well as by the "impure"
influences.
Along with some other North Caucasian peoples, the Chechens converted to Islam
on the eve of Russian expansion into their ancestral lands. For a variety of reasons they
largely adopted the Sufi forms of worship and followed Shamil, the third Imam of
Daghestan, in his efforts to impose the Sharia (Islamic Law) on the faithful while
defending their homeland from the encroachments of the Russian Empire in early 19 th
century by waging a holy war (Ghazivat). Our first Chechen paper (Religiolls
Brotherhoods ill Chechllya: Their RelevClll.ce for the Clzechell. Conflict) explained how the
Chechens were bled during these wars and then left the Naqshbandiya tradition in droves
to follow a later Sufi tradition, the Qadiri, under the leadership of the nonviolent
"Chechen Gandhi," Kunta Hadji of Kishiev.
When Kunta Hadji was captured by the Russians and died in captivity, his
followers eschewed non-violence and joined with the Naqshbandis in periodic uprisings
against the Tsarist regime and its Soviet successor. Each effort to regain some vestige of
independence was cruelly suppressed, Between 1944 and 1957, the Chechen people were
removed from their indigenous lands and deported to central Asia in order to be punished
for alleged collaboration with the German Nazi regime. Only the death of Stalin allowed
people to return to Chechnya and attempt to rebuild the nation,
The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 allowed independence-minded
Chechens to seize the opportunity and declare Chechnya an independent nation for the
Russian Federation. Fearing that other North Caucasian peoples might want to follow the
Chechen example, the Russian Federation under President Boris Yeltsin decided to make
an example of the Chechens and defeat them utterly as a warning to other indigenous
peoples from the Black Sea to the Caspian. After two desultory wars the Russians seem
in control but the Chechens continue to resist aided by volunteers from other Islamic
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lands who want to impose a more militant, fundamentalist Islam on the Muslims of the
Caucasus.

Background
In 1877,

the people of Chechnya and Daghestan launched a major rebellion
against the Russians who enjoyed control over their region. Although the rebellion was a
failure that served primarily to produce new tactics on the part of the Sufi brotherhoods
of the North Caucasus, the victorious Russian authorities responded not with oppression
but rather with tolerance toward the Islamic religion in Chechnya. The religious tolerance
of the post-rebellion years of 1877 to 1917 has led Chechens to speak of Tsarist
colonialism with nostalgia. One Chechen rebel commander, Shirvani Bassayev, brother
of the well-known Chechen guerilla commander Shamil Bassayev, recently noted that
had the Romanov dynasty retained power, Russia would have been a very different
nation. The key, Bassayev noted, is that men without faith, such as the Communists, "are
more dangerous than those who accept God as a higher power." I
The spirit of rebellion, coupled with religious fervor, continues to give the politics
of the North Caucasus a turbulent, violent flavor. Local people who have cooperated with
"men without faith," most significantly the Russian authorities who occupy much of this
region, increasingly find themselves the targets of rebels for whom this struggle has
assumed a spiritual as well as a political relevance. A typical incident was reported in the
summer of 2000 when Ruslan Khamidov, the mayor of Alkhan-Yurt, a small town ncar
Grozny, was approached by "unidentified assailants" at his home early one morning.
When he stepped outside his house, Khamidov was shot cleven times, an action generally
viewed as another warning for those who cooperated with the "Godless invaders." This
killing coincided with an attack on a Russian troop train on the rail line near Grozny. The
bombing, which was carried out by remote controiled mines, was followed by a small
arms attack which lasted for forty minutes. The incident left seven Russian military
casualties and more than a hundred yards of destroyed track. 2
While outside observers might view such events as little more than another expression of
the terrorism that has plagued so much of the former Soviet Union, many participants in
this struggle have an entirely different perception. For them, the murder of Ruslan
Khamidov was actually another episode in the continuing struggle between "men of
faith" and the infidels determined to destroy their way of life.
To better understand the logic of conflicts in the North Caucasus, a brief
description of the patterns of the region's religious and social life is necessary. The most
important characteristic of this society is its strict division along tribal and religious lines.
This is best illustrated in Chechnya. Although the Chechens are a separate ethnic group
clearly distinct from their neighbors, they seldom identify themselves with that group. In
everyday life, their identity is defined by two most meaningful concepts: teip - a union of
a
households tracing their descent from a common ancestor, or clan, and tllhkum- union
of teips which do not claim a common ancestor but historically have preserved their
military and economic ties and spoken one of the dialects of the Chechen language.
Traditional kinship ties are of paramount importance to the Chechens, and their loyalty

1

John B. Dunlop, Russia COllfrollts Chechllya: Roots of a Separatist COllfl ict , (New York: Cambridge UniversilY

Press, 1998), p. 33
2 Associated Press, 16 July, 2000.
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(muftiyas): Avartses with a population of 600,000; Dargintses ~ith a 320,000 ~op~llati~n;
Kumyks with 260, 000; Lezghins with 240,000; and Laktsts with 100,000. Thls.dlV~rslty
reflects the national composition of Daghestan. There are 95,000 Chechens-Akkms 111 the
region, 30,000 Naghaitses, and an assortment of about forty additional national groups.
Most of Daghestan's Sunni Muslim population belongs to the shqfiit mazhab
organization. During the last decade, the Sufi brotherhoods, which had lost importance
during the Soviet era, have been restored.
.
.
Currently there are over 40 Sufi brotherhoods m. Daghe~tan. .The. major
representatives of modern Sufism in Daghestan are ~heologlsts SaId Clmkelsk ~nd
Tadjuin Hasavyurt. Together, these men hold the allegl~nce .of ma~y devout Ml~sllll~s
who are adherents of a strict interpretation of the Koran. Hlstonans Will record that 111 thiS
region of the Northern Caucasus there are other people, individuals s~ch ~s Magh~med
Djeranskyi, who are less concerned about theology and, thr~ugh the.lr VIOlent aC~lOns,
bear much responsibility for the violence in the Caucasus. DJeranskYI, of course, IS not
alone as there are many others who share his militant attitude.
In Daghestan there are approximately 1700 large and as many as 6000 small
"district mosques." There are nine Islamic spiritual educational institutes and 600 mosque
schools throughout the republic. In addition, a significant number of Daghestani students
study in Muslim schools abroad. Of the 17,000 -18,000 Rus~i~n citizens participating .in
annual hadj, no less than 13,000 to 14,000 of them are cItIzens of Daghestan. It IS,
therefore, reasonable to conclude that the Daghestanis are more active in Muslim affairs
that the entire populations of Tatars, Bashkirs, and other Muslim nati.onalities.
.
A group that has attracted great attention in recent years IS the Va~habltes or
Vakhabists. They are referred to as fundamentalists in much of the Western lIterature on
Islam. They first appeared in the North Caucasus in the 1980's and emerged as a serious
force in the next decade. Most recently, their main communities were in Mahachkala and
Hasav-Yurt.
Today Vakhabite activity is prohibited in Daghestan .. As a r~sult, their scho?ls
and organizations operate secretly and they are involved m a va:.lety, of . cla~dest1l1e
activities. There are three main Vakhab factions in Daghestan. The first faction IS under
the leadership of Ahmed Ahtayev, an activist with a long histor~ of clandestine w.o~k.
The second faction is led by Baghaudin Muhhamad Daghestan!. Because of offiCial
pressure against his activities, he left Daghestan and is n~w based in Chechnya. The thi.rd
faction is based in communities in the Astrakhan region, a stronghold of Vakhablte
'..
support, but has not prominent individual ~ead~r.
In August 1999, many Daghestal1l radicals began traI~l~g m the camps run b~ a
Saudi Arabian calling himself Khattab. Khattab's group had Jomed Chechen extremists
and numerous Arab terrorists who invaded Daghestan. The goal of this union of Islamic
radicals is to bring about the secession of Daghestan from the Russian Federation. While
this association failed to achieve its immediate goal, it did bring about the introduction of
Russian forces into Chechnya, a situation that has greatly increased hardships throughout
the region. Many feel that this was probably one of the objectives of those who
organized the attacks in Daghestan.
.
.
One of the main reasons for the growth of Vakhablsm m Daghestan and
Chechnya is the difficult social and economic situation in the ~?rth Caucas.u~ as well as
the generous financing of the Vakhabites from abroad. T~1Us.' It IS ~ot surpnsmg th.at the
joint attacks by the Daghestani and Chechen militants comclded with the aggravation of
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tensions in the Middle East and the renewed international confrontations over oil and gas
routes.

Chechnya
~efore the m!litary clashes ~f 1994-1996, Chechnya covered a territory of 17,300
square kilometers With the populatIOn of 1,200,000 people. Of this group, 800-850,000
were Chechens, 200-250,000 were Russians, 20,000 were Inghush and about 15000
Armenian.
'
As a result of the conflict, Chechnya's population has been reduced to 500000
people, with a Slavic population of only 10,000 people. The physical destruction of the
region is widespread and cap.it~1 GroZI.1Y itself is now gradually being covered by new
forests as few people are wIilmg to mvest the resources required for rebuilding thedevastated city.
. The Ch~c.hens and the Ing.ush are Muslims-Sunnits. Approximately 90% of the
RUSSIans, UkraIllIans and BelorussJans of the Chechen Republic belonged to the Christian
Orthodox church, while the others belonged to the Evangelical and the Baptist Churches.
During the late 1990's, several Christian priests in Chechnya were kidnapped and
murdered.
. .
The ~ntensity of religiosity in Chechnya can be measured by two important
1l1dlcators. First, several thousand mosques, both regional and district ones were built
durin.g the last 1.5 years to serve the spiritual needs of this community. Se~ond, in the
RUSSIan FederatIOn, only Daghestan exceeds Chechnya in terms of the number of
pilgrims who journey to Mecca. One to two thousand Chechens participate in the hadj
each year.
Spiritual governance of Checnhya since the early 1990s was in the hands of a
body k~own as the Counci~ of Ulems and of an individual known as the MUftiya. The
former IS a group of theologIcal scholars and the latter is the head of Muslims. From 1995
until. early 2000, the Ml!ftiya. ~as ~hmad Hadji Kadyrov, who has recently been
appol11ted as the head of Adm1l11stratlOn of the Chechen RepUblic. In the summer of
2000, a new Ml!ftiya was elected by the Council of Ulems. That individual is the former
Iman of the Shatoi, region Ahmed Adji Shaman.
For. already several centuries Chechnya's traditional Islam has been represented
by two Sufi trends: the Naqshballdi and the Qadiri. The best known of the naqshbandi are
the brotherh?ods of Yusup-~adj~ ~nd Tashu-Hadji. The most numerous quadiri
brotherhood IS the Kunta-HadJI KlshJev order. The relations between these two Sufi
?rotherl~oods ?ave traditionally been very positive. Their representatives never engaged
111 c.onfllcts With each other, and never criticized the shaykhs of the other communities.
While there was an element of competition inherent during election of the imam of the
village mosque or Quadiri of the community, that competition never evolved into
dogmatic disputes.
T~er~ is no exact information on the emergence of Vakhabism in Chechnya, nor
a~out then' first preachers. Many scholars associate its appearance with the establishment
of th.e Islamic P~rty in 199 ~. Yet, Beslan Ghentaimirov, the first head of that party had
nothl11g to do WIth Vakhablsm. Furthermore, according to reliable accounts, leaders of
the Islamic Party, have been known to indulge in the excessive use of alcohol. Given the
hostility of the Vakhabites toward any use of alcohol, such behavior would indicate that
the Islamic Party leadership would not meet the standards for a Vakhabite organization.
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Others suggest that the appearance of Vakhabism is more correctly associated
with an individual known as Adam Deniev or, by many people, simply as "One-legged
Ahmed." Deniev has been a candidate member of the shaykh of Quadiri since 1995.
The first group in Chechnya to be openly associated with the Vakhabites and to
actually receive money from them consisted of Islam Khalimov, Isa Umarov, and
Movladi Udugov. Udugov, who was the Minister of Information in the Dudayev
government, arranged for the regular broadcasts the sermons of Vakhabite preachers on
Chechen television. This small circle of Vakhabites build an organization based on
kinship principles while avoiding any direct challenges to the established Islamic
community in Chechnya. In this early period, its operational principals were based on
absolute secrecy and the avoidance of open conflicts with the Islamic community.
The first Chechen war radicalized much of the population and eventually resulted
in the legalization of fundamentalist youth groups represented by the "Djamaat"
battalion. This move was facilitated by foreign involvement in the person of a ChechenJordanian Ipak Fath. He was an elderly man who came from Jordan to assist in the
development of fundamentalist groups in Chechnya. Fath had been a pmticipant in the
Afghan war during which he helped organize suicide detachments of idealists motivated
by the honor of dying in a holy war against the infidels. Eventually, lpak Fath succumbed
to disease but not before making a great contribution to the fundamentalist cause in
Chechnya. As a result of Fath's influence, Khattab and other veterans of the Afghanistan
war were enlisted for combat service in Chechnya.
The Jordanian connection was established approximately a century ago and
continues to have an impact on develops in the North Caucasus region. In the latter part
of the 19th century, thousands of Chechens as well as some Ingush traveled through
Turkey into the Middle East where they made their homes in Iraq and Jordan. Two
Chechen-Ingush villages still exist in haq today. In Jordan, the Chechens founded four
towns, one of which evolved into what is now the kingdom's second largest city, Zarqa.
As a result of this migration, the Jordanian diplomatic and military community today
reflects strong Chechen influences. In fact, during the 1948 war with the Palestine
Liberation Army, Jordan's foremost tank officer, Abdul-Latif Benno, was a Chechen and,
in 1978, became Jordan's first military attache in Moscow. 20t
Vakhabite influence increased significantly during the first Chechen war because
Dudayev refused to provide alternate financing. In the face of the severe funding crisis,
lpak Fath and his colleagues played a major role in purchasing armaments and providing
food and clothing for the Chechen forces. The foreign Vakhabite money was channeled
through Maskhadov's organization. Consequently, he was forced to make promises to
introduce Shari at governance following the war.
As a result of the radicalization of society and the effective use of foreign funds,
by 1996 the Vakhabites not only had a military organization in Chechnya, but also their
own courts, mullas, and scholars. To take advantage of this environment, Baghaudin
Khebedov left Daghestan to join his radical brethren in Chechnya. Other fundamentalists
such as Shamsudin from Prigorodnoye established reputations for themselves as Shariat
judges and numerous Chechen preachers who had taken refuge in Jordan were able to
return to their homeland.

~ft~r creation of the main state institutions of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria at
the. beg~I~Jllng of 19~7, the Vakhabites were rewarded by being able to legalize some of
theIr Imlttary fOIlTIatlOns and to. establish a b~se for training their military personnel led
by commander Khattab. Their representatives were placed in numerous off . I
..
. II
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govemment positIOns, especla y those relating to the courts and public secUl'ity b d'
.
V
kh
.
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Th e gro,":lI1g a. ~blte 111. ~Ience 111 the Maskhadov government eventually resulted in a
:very senous polItlc.al cnsls brought about by demand for curbing the Vakhabite
ll1fl~l~nce. The M~lfttat headed by Khadyrov demanded that President Maskhadov take
decIsIve steps agamst those whom he denounced as "enemies of Islam and the Chech
nation."
en
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In June 1998, the crisis led to armed clashes with the Vakhabite detachments near
Gudermes. In those battles, a group of government field commanders defeated the
Vakhab forces and it was only the intervention of President Maskhaelov and Vice
President A. Arsanov that saved them from a devastating, final defeat. After these battles
tw~ Vakhabite generals who had demonstrated crass incompetence were reduced t~
enhsted ranks. Khattab was order~d to close his training camps and to leave Chechnya.
For the g.avernment the :VIctory was not complete. While the order to disband his
camps was pubhshed, Khattab Ignored it. The Vakhab forces regrouped in the town of
Vrus-Martan anel Khattab formed an alliance with Shamil Bassayev. The financial
support from abro~d enabled t~e Vakh':b.ites to function without any financial support
from the st~te bodle~ of Ichkena. A fortified outpost was set up in Urus-Martan. At this
s~age Of. theIr e,:,olutlOn: the Va~habites utilized more mundane tactics, such as theft and
kldn.app1l1g, varIOUS actIOns aga1l1st t~e young Chechen state, and personal attacks against
president Maskhadov. Several assasslllation attempts were made against Maskhadov and
Khad~rov. Thus, th~y concentrated on political and criminal activities as a means of
opposll1g the IslamiC establishment of Checl1l1ya While avoiding open la 'ge- I
' I sca e
ml'1'Itary cI as hes.
'.

In the fall of 1999,. Bass.ayev's detachments joined Daghestani Vakhabites and,

Wlt~ the help of Arab muellaha?~ns, made military strikes against Daghestan authorities.
While the attacks were a mllttary failure, they did bring about concessions from

Maskhadov. In an ef~ort to appeas~ his o~ponents, Maskhadov included Bassayev in the
State Defense CommIttee and app01l1ted hun as a military commander.
T~el~y Vakhabites are exclu?ed from the religious life of Chechnya and Khadyrov
now prohibits all forms of Vakhablte propaganda. This is part of an effort to resto tl
.
f h
d' .
, re le
prestIge o· tetra ItlOnal Muslim faith. Unfortunately, during this period the so I'al I
f r'
.
, ,c, roe
~ r~ I~~on III gen~ral has dec.lined; th.us, even if .the traditional Islamic community
legall1s Its lost prestIge, Islam Will not enJoy the promlllent position its once held.
The prese~ce of ?:,er IOO,~OO.Russian troops on the territory of the RepUblic and
the e~l~less RUSSIan mIlItary activIties are .a ~ajor source of discontent among the
populatIon .. NoIany Ch~chens, however, are stOIC III the face of such adversities and regard
them a~ dlv1l1e pUl1lshment for their arrogance and their willingness to admit the
Vakhabltes, whom they ~enounce ~s "servants of Devil" into their country.
At presen~, Mushm clergy 111 Chechnya are mull as and imams. Muslim clergy in
Chechnya are hIghly educated people who were trained in Islamic institutions of
Chechnya, ~agh~sta.n, ?zbekistan, Pakistan and Egypt. In addition, Chechnya has its
o~n theologlca~ II1stltutlons and s~hools. Thel:e are Sunday Arab Koran schools in every
Village. In othel wordsm, the prestIge of IslamIC clergy has increased in Chechnya as they
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have withdrawn from politics. The important point is that Islam is .not being politicized as
the Vakhabites wished. In this new environment, _t.h? IslamiC ~Iergy can express
themselves freely on major issues without fearing for offiCial persecutIOn.

adheres to ethical norms of mountaineers, rather than to religious values. Unofficial Sufi
brotherhoods never played a significant role in this region. By the 1970s religious
traditions such as circumcision, having a mull a' s blessing for all marriages, and others
had been eliminated.

Inghushetia

In the 1990' s new phenomena of spiritual life related to the interest in the Muslim
values and "the great past" started to appear in the national republics of the Central and
Northern-West Caucasus. Religious governance headed by muftias was introduced
throughout the region. Islamic educational institutions, including higher educational
facilities, were opened. Most were created with encouragement and funding from abroad.
Mosques were restored in practically all communities of Balkaria, Cherkessia, and
Ossetia. Eight mosques were opened in Karachayevo-Cherkessia, even though Muslim
population amounts for only half of the popUlation there. The other half of the local
population embraces Orthodox Christianity.

.
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The completion of the Islamization process in these republics has been associated
with at least one constant theme. The radical Islamic organizations have worked to fill in
the vacuum that appeared after the disappearance of the communist ideology. The
"Daavat" groups have popularized Vakhabism and recruited youth from the mountain
regions into military groups. During the period fr0111 1996 to 1999 dozens of young
people from Balkaria and Karachay were trained in the camps of Khattab near SejenYurt. They were active participants in military activities during the 15t Chechen war.
Traditional Islam is regaining its lost status primarily among the peoples who
suffered from deportation during World War II, especially among Balkars and
Karachayevos. Many elements of Sufi practice have been restored in the communities
populated by those who have returned from internal exile.
The hostility of traditional believers towards the Vakhabites has grown stronger
because the Vakhabites, who view only Vakhab traditions as legitimate, do not recognize
the customs and traditions of the mountaineers as valid. In Kabardin-Balkaria fight
against Vakhabism has been especially determined and often bitter. Authorities have
eliminated the most ardent armed extremists and have expelled or disbanded a number of
suspicious organizations financed from abroad.
There are up to 2000 Vakhabites in Karachay, but their ranks often include
common Muslim radicals who have not formally embraced the Vakhab faith. While it is a
tribute of dubious merit, one must note that it was the Karachay Vakhabites who were
recruited to commit acts of terrorism in Moscow and Volgodonsk.
The heads of both Christian Orthodox and Muslim communities deny that there
has been a religious intrusion into the territory of the North Caucasus. That is why the
Russian Orthodox stChurch has not given any special blessing for the war in Chechnya
nd
either during the 1 or the 2 Chechen Wars. It disapproves of the cruel treatment of
local civilians by the army but takes no public position on any of these concerns.

Vakhabism and the Chechen Conflict
While the focus of this study has been the North Caucasus region, the impact of
religion on the region's conflict has been most dramatic in Chechnya. In contemporary
Chechnya, as noted above, traditional Islam is challenged by a new phenomenon called
vakhabism. Originally, this movement emerged in the 18 th century and was named after
its founder AI-Vakhab. He claimed that Islam was distorted and called his followers to
"purify" it and return to Islam's fundamentals. Nowadays vakhabism is spread across the
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Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, where it is accepted as an official ideology of the
royal family. Vakhabism in Chechnya (as well as Tadjikistan), however, does not relate
directly to vakhabism as it is understood by Sunni Muslims in the Middle East countries.
Although the main idea is the same-the purification of Islam from both "pagan" and
modern influences-Chechen vakhabism has a set of characteristics that distinguish it
from religious values and practices in Saudi Arabia.
The Vakhabite movement has deep implications for Chechnya's religious, social
and political life. Its call to purify Islam chal1enges Chechnya's traditional Islam,
something which is heavily influenced by the local system of beliefs and norms, as well
as an elaborate structure of religious communities and brotherhoods. In fact, Vakhabism
attempts to "return" the population to what it views as "original" Islam, rejecting
Chechnya's unique historical experience. The key to this transformation is the application
of rules, norms and practices accepted among the radicals in the Middle East to the
Chechen social and political life. Hence, traditionalists (who constitute the overwhelming
majority of the popUlation) associate Vakhabism with foreign influence, which poses a
threat to their religious customs and identity. For their part, the Vakhabites view the
supporters of traditional Islam as backward sectarians who distort Islam. The conflict
between fundamentalists and traditionalists, along with less sharp but nevertheless
significant divisions among Sufi sects, since the early 1990s has had a profound impact
on Chechen politics, including the ongoing Russian military operation in the region.
During the 1994-1996 military operation, the Russian federal troops were a
common enemy for most Sufi brotherhoods and Vakhabites. Both were mobilizing the
population against the federal government (most Chechen leaders identified themselves
with Sufi brotherhoods to secure the support of their members; for example, President
Dudayev declared that he belonged to the Kunta-Hadji brotherhood). Therefore, their
differences were temporarily put aside. Moreover, the Vakhabites managed to strengthen
their position in Chechnya. Money, armament and fighters provided by their radical
counterparts from abroad were crucial to the Chechen resistance against the federal forces
and enabled Vakhabites to become an influential group in the repUblic. The relations
between Sufi brotherhoods and Vakhabites deteriorated dramatically after the end of the
1994-1996 campaign. Their religious differences spilled over into politics.
In the political realm, traditionalists and fundamentalists disagreed over how the
Chechen state ought to be organized and what its policy towards Russia should look like.
Sufi Muslims advocated a secular state that would preserve Chechnya's traditional social
structure and its unique Islamic culture. Their position on the future of Russian-Chechen
relations was not uniform and ranged from calls for independence to the development of
a "special status" within the Russian Federation. There is no evidence that Sufi
brotherhoods had any interest in protracting the conflict or extending it beyond
Chechnya's borders. Vakhabites were determined to build a "pure" Muslim society which
would be organized and regulated according to the Shariat law (as opposed to adat traditional norms developed in Chechnya before the adoption of Islam). "Just Islamic
order" as they believe it had existed in the times of the Arabic khalifat became the goal of
Chechnya's religious extremists. Furthermore, they embraced the idea of creating a larger
Islamic state in the Northem Caucasus which would include Daghestan, Ingushetia and
possibly other Russian regions. Since those regions chose to stay in the Federation and
their predominantly Muslim population did not sympathize with fundamentalism, the
only means of achieving this objective was aggression against Russia and then gazavat
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(or jih~d) - h?ly war aga~nst non-believers (in Daghestan, since the early 1990s the
p'0pula~lOn ,;e}ected the .Ideas of vakhabism and the leadership declared them
. undeSIrable 111 the repu~hc. In June, 2000 all Vakhabite organizations were prohibited
Daghestan by an act of Its parliament).
Thus, V ~khabites chal\enged the official Chechen leadership (President
Maskhadov and ItS supporters) and posed a serious threat to the foundations f tl
.
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between tradItlonaltst~ and radicals resulted in violence several times; for instance, as
noted above, Vakhabltes ~Ia~hed with Sufi Muslims in May, 1998 in Gudelmes and
~rus-Martan and the.n agam :n Gudermes in July, 1998 (approximately 50 people were
killed that day). Feanng th~t fundamentalists will destabilize the situation in the republic
a~l~ attempt to. r~bel agamst ?rozny, Maskhadov. dec1~red the state of emergency,
dIssolved and dlsatmed the Shanat Guards and IslamiC regiment, and ordered to exile the
wel.l-known warlord Khattab, a mercenary from Jordan who allegedly cooperated with
rachcals. On July 23, 1998 there was an attempt in Grozny to assassinate Maskhadov an
:.
attempt probably organized by Vakhabites. Observers from Russia Georgl'a Aze'b
I atJan
and Chechnya Itself agreed that at that pOInt the republic was on the brink of civI'1
. I'
.
war.
D esplte
.
t lelr relatively ~trong positions, Vakhabites were not able to assert their
ll1f1uence throughout the repu?hc, much less impose their ideology in its entire territory.
~owever, they wen~ ahead WIth their plans to occupy neighboring Russian regions and
ll1~~d~d Dag!lestan .111 A:Igust, 1999. Although me~bers of Sufi brotherhoods may have
pattt~lpated 111 the mvaSlOn as well, the Idea and Its implementation are blamed by the
RUSSIan
the local population
primarily on Vakhabites . Subscequen t
.
" govemment and
.
. .
1I1vestlgatl~ns and the fact t~at the offlc~als Grozny from the very beginning announced
that the7 did not have ?llythll1g to do with the events in Daghestan and condemned the
a~gre~slo~ further conv1l1ced Moscow that fundamentalists had started their jihad and the
SituatIOn 111 Ch.e:hI~ya was out of control. Vakhabites were perceived as a major threat to
peac~ and.stabll.lty m the Northern Caucasus and the territorial integrity of the Federation.
The 1l1VaSlOn of Daghestan and the Vakhabites' plans to wage a holy war aaainst Ru .
f"
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sSla
'l h . .
un tI t e CleatlOn 0 a pure y IslamIC state 111 ItS southern territories were the top reasons
that p~ompted the federal government to start a military operation in Chechnya
Immediately after the defeat of those who attacked Daghestan.
As .the feder~1 troops advanced into Chechnya, however, they had to fight not
only IslamiC extremIsts but also the members of Sufi brotherhoods who, like in 19941996, R~ssian contro~ f?r various reasons opposed. Unlike fundamentalists, Sufi Muslims
do not fIght f~r a. reh~lOus. caus~ and tend to have more reasonable positions on issues.
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o.rgal1Ized volunteer troops to fIght aga1l1st both Sufi and Vakhabite rebels on the Russian
SIde.
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~ brief, a. certain S:lfi co~munit~ mayor may not fight the Russians or
."akhabltes depend.1I1g OI:.thelr traditions, hIstory, kinShip ties, religious idiosyncrasies
and even geographIC position (the popUlation in the mountains is generally perceived as
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very militant and hostile even to fellow Chechens from the flatland, whereas the northern
part of the republic has been loyal to Moscow). On the other hand, Vakhabites are, almost
by definition, inclined to resist the Russian military operation and subsequent restoration
of peaceful life and order. Therefore, the Russian government, the military and the
population at large view Vakhabites or any other radical Islamic movement as the biggest
obstacle to the stabilization of the situation in Chechnya. Traditional Sufi groups are
MoscoW's most valuable partners in the struggle against extremism when they choose to
cooperate, and therefore the federal government makes efforts to support traditional
Chechen institutions mentioned above - teips, tukhums, virds and tarikats. There is a
belief that they will help prevent the spread of extremism and facilitate the return to
normal life.

The Vakhabite Perspective

We first need to emphasize a number of important points. First, Chechen society
has a very complicated structure and is fragmented along the lines of kinship and
religious identification. All politics is local and driven by narrowly defined interests of
clans or brotherhoods. A nationwide movement, whether pro-Russian or anti-Russian, is
not likely to emerge as long as the present tendencies persist. The roots of and the
solutions for the Chechen crisis are in interactions among different factions of the society,
not in national interests or aspirations of an ethnic group asserting itself. Second, Sufi
brotherhoods play an important role in mobilizing public support either for or against the
central government or any other authority; their decisions and actions are best explained
individually on the case-by-case basis. Third, religious extremism does exist in Chechnya
and for various reasons is accepted among a certain portion of the population. It calls for
the redesign of the Chechen society in accordance with the principles of fundamentalist
Islam and the conquest of neighboring lands, thus antagonizing traditionalists within
Chechnya and the federal government. The confrontation between them and Sufi
Muslims has been one of the most dramatic aspects of the Chechen crisis. Fourth,
Vakhabites triggered the next round of violence, and the events in Daghestan became the
reason why the federal government responded with a military operation. Fifth, since
Vakhabites are currently the biggest threat to MoscoW's interests, the federal government
has supported traditional Chechen institutions, including religious brotherhoods in the
assumption that they will effectively resist foreign radical ideas, although they also often
deny Russian authority.
In order to better understand the perspective of the Vakhabites, Mr. Albert
Avduev, a member of the Chechen disaspora who works as an oil engineer, has presented
his view of this phenomenon. While he privately describes himself as a "secret
Vakhabite" he is very open in his efforts to promote a better understanding of the
principals of those people who wish to cleanse Islam of its alien characteristics.
Avduev prefers not to use the term Vakhabite, insisting that this term itself is a
result of Russian propaganda. He maintains that Russian historians have distorted not
only Islam but the movement that seeks to reform Islamic practice. For A vduev, Russian
colonization led to a situation in which both the Islamic faith as well as Islamic society
were corrupted. The flight of Russian serfs from the oppressive Czarist administrators
was a significant factor that enabled Russians to penetrate the Caucasus as well as other
portions of southern Russia.

Avduev explains this process as one which was d .
b
Caucasus in'
b aan
partIcular. The Russian mass media, he argues have long prese tUd tlgaICnst hechens 111
o b'"
I'k
' " n e 1e aucasus people
.
aIe e1l1g more I e orangutans than humans" . Rllssl'a' s aversIon
to the peopl
f
e 0
CI1ec h nya and Daghestan led to a deliberate policy of enocid
centu:y.
traitors" and Russians, he
IslamIC
faith.
According
to .
Avduev
t1e only
tlue
. f d
.
' a "holy war against non- be I'level.s"lstOlt
was the
01
evout
Musltms.
WIth
the
weakening
of
comm
.
t
I
I
.
option
U111S IU e, t 1e true beltevers of
I N h C
t 1e ort
aucasus
..
.
' were able to work to restol'e t11'
elr Iegltnnate
nghts
R .
..
. ' us sIan
authontles, Avduev 1I1sists, have undertaken a renewed geno 'd I
the restoration of a true Islamic society in the North Caucas us. CI a campaIgn to prevent

prej~ldice against all people of the North

"~eligious

gel:~~~n ~

~xtr~ne RussI~n
0

maintain~, work:;st;a~~y a~ t~e l~th
0

0

0

Conclusion
While Islam has been very important in the development of the N °tl C
region the
I r
I
01 1
aucasus
H' t : II Pleo P els IV111g.t lere. do not identify with any single sect or doctrine
onca y,
am of '
thiS regIon was suffused
with
. customs and.
oISdOt'
Tht leN Is I
,m
a n y pre- Is Iamlc
e ort 1'
CaucaSIan federation forged by SI1aml,
'1 Imam of Daghestan waged
tta I IOns..
a h0 Iy Wal (ghazavat)
aga111st
. Iaw tI1roughout
'
.
h
R ' the old ways ill order to impose lsI'dlmc
the
aga111st
t
e
USSIan
Empire
in
order
to
presel've't
.
d
d
e
an
d
t
ISmana
f f h N'
"
I S 111 epen ence. Shamll. a
I
'
u lOt e aqshbandl order, demanded great sacrifices from h'
IS peop es but was
eventually conquered by the Russians.
0

In the .~econd half of the 1?th ~entury another Sufi order took root in the North
was the more paCIfIstIC Qadiri order foun d ed b y Kullta-HadJ" Klshmev
.
Caucasus.. .ThIS .,
.
.
.
.
d trl t partIcIpated
TI
'1' h f halong
R 'with the Naqshbandi in va,nous
111smrectJons
and revolts.
d 1eo· Q ath
l1l111g e WI Ig tot e usslan Empire and throughout the Soviet .' d B h .
Y t e tIme
Chechnya
declared its independence in 1991 ' th e Q ad'IrI.p~llO.
b
h unilaterally
d .
nte had evolved
to
ecome t e. ommant form of Sufism in Chechenya
Dunng the 1990s and based on its support of Cheche . d
d
epen
the
fundamentalist Vakhabite movement has become a rna' or re
numerou.s efforts by the Qadiri Chechens to
its
.of
lIS offiCIal
suppressIOn has resulted in the emergence of a clandestine Vakhabite
Olk supported
from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Afghanistan.
.
The Chech~n diaspora, which has played a major supporting role in th
d
Mloddle East,
former Ottoman Empire and successor states such a:
JOldan, has proVIded. aId and soldiers to support their CI~~~~~~y
I
.
q
armaments, and soldIers (mujahideen) provided by various ndic I I I . .
,
abroad h
I
I d
.
'
a s amlc crroups from
,
ave a so p. aye a major role in strengthening Chechen resistance.
'"
After the
Chechen war (1994-1996) "religious
dl·f·c e s between the Sufi
11
d fIrst
I
eren
~ovement~, an t ~e Vakhabites began to have a deleterious political impact in tl
.
hlol~ SufI Mushms called for the creation of a secular state th
le ~egl~n.
tradItional social patterns, the Vakhabites have demanded a
"f' t' at wfould pleselve
end' r
fI I
PUll Ica IOn 0 Islam and the
, Ica IOn 0 oc~ customs ~hat have tainted and undermined pure Islam.
. The RUSSIan Federallon was greatly humiliated by its loss of tl f '
Wat through the peace brokered by General Lebed in 1996
M
. 1e Irst
and military officers longed for an opportunity to avenge 'this
honor.
Vakhabite effort to spread a pan-Islamic
Daghestan m 1999 gave Russia the opportunity it sought to redeem itself.
by mvadmg

suppres~

io~a;nf
enc~,
fnfluenc:rc~1 ?esplt~
net~
0

esp~cIally ~he

Th~

~:o ~~~
0

C~~c.hen
~ny l111p~r:ant 'pohlt~Ians

fundamenta~~:t :'~vi~:fatn .nat\o~1al

140

Islam in the North Caucasus: A People Divided

Within Chechnya. a divided people are confronted by two polar choices: either to
work within the Russian Federation and survive physically or to sacrifice the nation upon
the altar of jihad. Other Caucasian peoples (Circassians, Balkars, Ingush, Avars and
Kumyks among others have opted to stay within the Russian Federation. Only the
Chechens seem unable to moderate in the name of coexistence.

Chapter Eight

FRAUD AND CORRUPTION IN THE FORMER USSR: FALSE
IDENTITIES IN MOLDOVA

